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ABSTRACT
Cloud computing is a newly emerging technology where storage, computation and services
are extensively shared among a large number of users through virtualization and distributed
computing. This technology makes the process of detecting the physical location or own-
ership of a particular piece of data even more complicated. As a result, improvements in
data provenance techniques became necessary. Provenance refers to the record describing
the origin and other historical information about a piece of data. An advanced data prove-
nance system will give forensic investigators a transparent idea about the data’s lineage, and
help to resolve disputes over controversial pieces of data by providing digital evidence. In
this paper, the challenges of cloud architecture are identified, how this affects the existing
forensic analysis and provenance techniques is discussed, and a model for efficient provenance
collection and forensic analysis is proposed.
Keywords: data provenance, conceptual model, cloud architecture, digital forensic, digital
evidence, data confidentiality, forensic requirements, provenance challenges
1. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, advancement in data pro-
cessing and communication technology and
theabundance of digital storage capacity en-
able coupling multiple computing resources
tomanage large amount of data. The con-
cept of cloud computing was developed to of-
ferthis computing power and storage as ser-
vice virtually. In such a utility-based busi-
nessmodel, a consumer can utilize the of-
fered services on-demand following the ”pay-
as-you-go”approach (Voorsluys, Broberg, &
∗Corresponding Author
Buyya, 2011). However, efficient data man-
agement must include some other param-
eters to maintain the quality of the data
and enable reusing it. Data provenance or
lineage is a form of metadata that stores
the origin of a piece of data, keeps track of
its ownership, and manages the history of
the computational processing the data goes
through in its lifetime. This data manage-
ment technique is useful not only as a source
of data regeneration or as a component for
identifying errors through backward track-
ing, it also helps in regulatory purposes and
resolving disputes by facilitating a proper in-
vestigation in digital forensics. These as-
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pects of provenance records make it an es-
sential topic to be discussed in cloud archi-
tecture.
Clouds basically use the concept of multi-
tenancy and virtualization to ensure efficient
utilization of available resources. It identi-
fies and solves some challenges of large scale
data processing, such as on-demand resource
allocation based on computational require-
ments, distribution and coordination of jobs
among different machines, automatic recov-
ery management, dynamic scaling of oper-
ations based on workloads, and releasing
the machines when all the jobs are com-
plete (Amazon Web Services, 2008). These
features make cloud computing a popular
choice for small and medium scale indus-
tries, and research says this market will ex-
pand with a 30% CAGR (Compound An-
nual Growth Rate) to reach 270 billion by
2020 (Market Research Media, 2016). As
cloud computing grows in popularity, so do
concerns about security, compliance, privacy
and legal matters (Chung & Hermans, 2010).
Storing data in a location with an unknown
owner’s record with thinner boundaries, and
backing up data by an untrusted third party
are a couple of the notable security con-
cerns with cloud architecture (Hashizume,
Rosado, Ferna´ndez-Medina, & Fernandez,
2013). These issues can eventually affect the
trustworthiness of the data, as well as the
metadata associated with it, making it dif-
ficult to find accurate evidence to apply in
forensics. Though there are several digital
forensic tools to apply in general IT scenar-
ios, most of them have failed to prove their
success over cloud architecture. Thus, new
digital forensic methods must be developed
to meet the challenges of a cloud architec-
ture.
In this paper, a provenance model to in-
crease the capability of digital forensics in a
cloud environment will be examined. While
this model can be experimented on other
cloud deployment models, the public cloud
architecture will be the focus as it introduces
more challenges than the other models. The
rest of the paper is organized as follows: In
Section 2, basic concepts of public cloud, dig-
ital forensic and data provenance along with
their challenges and requirements will be dis-
cussed. In Section 3, previous work on re-
lated areas will be explored. In Section 4,
the proposed data provenance model will be
discussed along with additional design con-
siderations. Finally, conclusions and future
work will be discussed in Section 5.
2. BACKGROUND
2.1 Public Cloud
(Mell, Grance, et al., 2011) defined Cloud
computing as a “model for enabling ubiq-
uitous, convenient, on-demand network ac-
cess to a shared pool of configurable comput-
ing resources (e.g., networks, servers, stor-
age, applications, and services) that can be
rapidly provisioned and released with min-
imal management effort or service provider
interaction.” With lots of services offered
through advanced technologies, cloud com-
puting is redefining computing technology.
Its “pay-as-you-go” and “provision-as-you-
go” make it the most suitable choice for
storing personal information, maintaining
shared documents with a large group of
users, and hosting large applications that
require higher computational power. As
cloud computing offers wide ranges of ser-
vices based on demand from a single user to
a large organization, different service and de-
ployment models have been designed. One of
the widely used deployment models of cloud
service is public cloud, which (Jansen &
Grance, 2011) describe as an “infrastructure
and computational resource” that is “owned
and operated by an outside party that de-
livers to the general public via multi-tenant
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platform”. Figure-1 depicts a general ar-
chitecture of the public cloud model where
cloud consumers are accessing the infrastruc-
ture of a cloud provider.
Figure 1. Public Cloud Model (Bohn et al.,
2011)
2.1.1 Challenges
As its definition suggests, the public cloud
model is actually designed to offer individu-
als and enterprises the opportunity to mini-
mize cost with on-demand infrastructure and
computation support in a shared environ-
ment. However, the shift of control over the
data and application to a different adminis-
trative entity raises some security and pri-
vacy concerns. A cloud provider’s reliable
and powerful infrastructure is often vulner-
able to threats like media failures, malicious
attacks or software bugs. Their ability to
access a user’s data with malicious inten-
tion is another type of privacy issue found
in the public cloud model. (Ren, Wang, &
Wang, 2012) identified data owners’ inabil-
ity to monitor and define the access control
policy and lack of control over the record rel-
evant to cloud resource consumption as pos-
sible security challenges.
(Bohn et al., 2011) and (Ren et al., 2012)
considered hardware virtualization as an-
other critical privacy and security issues.
Hardware virtualization leads to a multi-
tenant architecture where the physical in-
frastructures are shared among multiple con-
sumers with logically separated control over
the resources. An attacker might be able to
overcome this logical separation using config-
uration errors or software bugs to gain illegit-
imate access. Accessing services over the in-
ternet also increases vulnerabilities through
various network threats (Bohn et al., 2011).
When an organization manages its own re-
sources and records in its secured computing
environment, it can clearly arrange the nec-
essary protective measures and have a de-
tailed idea about the location and structure
of the data. On the contrary, cloud comput-
ing services are dispersed and data is dupli-
cated over multiple locations to ensure avail-
ability of the records. Cloud providers main-
tain this information solely to eliminate pos-
sible security breaches. However, the inabil-
ity to locate the actual position of the data
is a major compliancy concern for an orga-
nization while exporting its business control
over to the cloud (Kandukuri, Rakshit, et
al., 2009).
2.2 Digital Forensics
With the expanding use of technological de-
vices and widespread adoption of commu-
nication networks to share data, it has be-
come necessary to develop technologies that
can store and examine records from differ-
ent sources. Digital forensics is a logical
approach to identifying, collecting, and ex-
amining data while ensuring the integrity
and chain of custody is properly preserved
and maintained. (Kent, Chevalier, Grance,
& Dang, 2006) describe several applications
of digital forensics based on a variety of
data sources, such as investigating cyber-
crime and violations of internal policy, recon-
structing security incidents, troubleshooting
operational problems and recovering from
system damage.
(Zawoad, Hasan, & Skjellum, 2015) pro-
vide an elaborate description of the steps of
the digital forensic process based on the for-
mal definition. Figure-2 demonstrates the
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digital forensic process flow. The identifica-
tion process consists of two steps where the
incident and most relevant evidence are iden-
tified along with their possible correlation
with other incidents in the system. In the
collection step, all digital evidence related
to an incident is accumulated from different
sources, preserving their integrity. Later, the
records are properly organized by extracting
and investigating the data characteristics. In
the final stage, a well formulated document
is prepared by the investigator to present to
the court.
Figure 2. Process Flow of Digital Forensic
(Zawoad et al., 2015)
2.2.1 Challenges
Applying the digital forensic process in a
simple computing architecture is complex by
nature in and of itself; however, when a
cloud architecture is taken into considera-
tion, the process becomes even more chal-
lenging. The distributed nature of cloud
infrastructure and some of its features af-
fect the credibility of the collected artifacts
and eventually increase the complexity of the
forensic process in each of its steps.
(O’shaughnessy & Keane, 2013) illus-
trated some of the issues relevant to the
cloud forensic process while describing the
difference from the general approach of dig-
ital forensics based on the “Integrated Digi-
tal Investigation Process Model” of (Carrier,
Spafford, et al., 2003). Carrier illustrated
the relevance between digital and physical
investigation and described the digital in-
vestigation model with five phases – preser-
vation, survey, search and collection, re-
construction and presentation. However,
(Alqahtany, Clarke, Furnell, & Reich, 2015)
identified the challenges based on the gen-
eral process model of forensics – identifica-
tion, collection, organization and presenta-
tion. Forensic challenges in cloud computing
in this paper will be described referencing
both of these models.
Any digital investigation must begin with
the collection of the digital device to preserve
the artifact related to an occurrence. In
cloud computing, volatile memory of a vir-
tual machine instance and the unavailabil-
ity of the virtual images demands creation of
advanced technologies to preserve evidence.
Logs, the valuable container of evidence, are
maintained by the cloud providers, but in-
tegrity of this data might be affected by un-
lawful actions. A cloud environment also
imposes restrictions over the control of data
and relational information (e.g., location of
data) which reduces the opportunity of ef-
fective data preservation.
Once the necessary evidence is preserved
and ready for initial analysis to build a sat-
isfactory theory, the incident identification
process can begin. (O’shaughnessy & Keane,
2013) described the effect of cloud service
models in this phase. In both Software as
a Service (SaaS) and Platform as a Service
(PaaS), the consumer has limited access to
the cloud infrastructure, which leaves the
investigator with a limited option to iden-
tify any occurrence directly in the server in-
stance. Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS)
provides better access than the other two
models as it allows the client to configure
their server with necessary logs. The dif-
ferent level of access in the different ser-
vice models eventually hinders the process
of building a unified model for incident iden-
tification and documentation.
Data collection involves accumulating
data from different sources like storage de-
vices, client’s browser history, client’s com-
munication with the service provider and ac-
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cess information of the cloud and other net-
work level data. Distributed cloud architec-
tures introduce various challenges for the in-
vestigator in this phase. They require ex-
tensive knowledge of the cloud architecture,
data storage techniques, extraction mecha-
nisms for preserving data integrity and main-
taining privacy of cloud consumers. Also,
shared storage for managing the logging in-
formation for multiple enterprises raise con-
cern for privacy concern if any incident needs
thorough investigation and require collect-
ing the complete logging information. Data
collection also might be affected by inte-
gration of inefficient provenance techniques,
lack of time synchronization and inappropri-
ate maintenance of the chain of custody.
Collected records are further used in a con-
trolled environment to reconstruct an inci-
dent to solidify theory building in the re-
construction phase. This requires arranging
records from different sources in a unified
structure, identifying correlations between
different events to successfully recreate the
incident. Unavailability of proper forensic
tools and utility applications in a cloud envi-
ronment introduces critical challenges in this
phase.
A successful forensic investigation ends
with the submission of a well-formulated
documentation of an incident in the court
with proper digital and physical artifacts to
defend the report. The distributed nature
of the cloud might require a detailed ex-
planation for proper understanding by the
jury, location of data might introduce dif-
ficulty to determine the judicial boundary,
and sources and the data collection process
might be questioned for the lack of credibil-
ity; hence, all these issues need to be over-
come during this phase.
2.2.2 Requirements
(Bohn et al., 2011), in their conceptual refer-
ence model of cloud architecture, mentioned
about five major cloud actors with their
defined responsibilities and offered services.
Figure 3 illustrates a cloud architecture fo-
cusing on the cloud actors, based on the
high-level architecture shown in (Bohn et al.,
2011). Each actor has sole or shared respon-
sibilities to execute different business trans-
actions or operations in a cloud environment.
In this scenario, cloud providers offer ser-
vices which are negotiated by the brokers,
connected and transported by the carrier,
used by the cloud consumers and evaluated
independently for performance and security
by auditors.
Figure 3. Conceptual Architecture of Cloud
The contribution of these actors is later
used by (Ruan & Carthy, 2012) when dis-
cussing the different types of digital investi-
gations. While an investigator is responsible
for the external investigations, cloud actors
play a vital role in the internal investigations
by taking various measures for security into
consideration. Based on the (Cloud Secu-
rity Alliance, 2011) defined by Cloud Secu-
rity Alliance, (Ruan & Carthy, 2012) pre-
sented a list of responsibilities of different
cloud actors in digital forensics. The respon-
sibilities are identified as required criteria of
cloud forensics.
Ensuring data ownership with steward-
ship, data retention and disposal, data reten-
tion and disposal, facility security, clock syn-
chronization, and integrating audit log and
intrusion detection are identified as the sole
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responsibilities of the cloud provider [23].
Data ownership with stewardship helps in
determining ownership of the records and
maintaining a chain in custody in the foren-
sic investigation. With a proper backup fa-
cility and redundant data storage policy, the
provider can ensure successful data reten-
tion. Strict data disposal operations also
need to be integrated to ensure complete re-
moval of data from all the sources without
leaving any option to recover them. Backups
are the only possible means of reconstructing
any event or incident.
Cloud providers also need to ensure
there are controlled access and authoriza-
tion checks for any entry to the facility and
during data relocation to a different facil-
ity. In digital forensics, identifying events
in proper order helps in incident reconstruc-
tion. Cloud providers need to ensure that all
the processes are running under a synchro-
nized environment. Integrating different log-
ging functionality to record every single op-
eration is another important responsibility
of cloud providers, which undoubtedly plays
the most vital role in digital forensic.
(Ruan & Carthy, 2012) also listed some
shared responsibilities of providers and con-
sumers based on the (Cloud Security Al-
liance, 2011). Defining meaningful taxon-
omy, depending on data type, origin, legal or
contractual constraints and sensitivity, helps
in forensic investigations. All the impor-
tant assets need to be recorded with owner-
ship information, and different data-related
operations need to be logged with common
forensic related terms. For the purpose of fa-
cilitating regulatory, statutory and contrac-
tual requirements for compliance mapping,
elements might be assigned with legislative
domains and jurisdiction. Other shared re-
sponsibilities of the provider and consumer
include authorization, multi-factor authen-
tication, establishment of policy and proce-
dure as a part of incident management, and
preservation of data and evidence integrity.
2.3 Data Provenance
Data provenance has proved its applicabil-
ity and necessity in different application do-
mains, data processing systems and repre-
sentation models. For e-science, it can be
used for transformation and easy derivation
of data. In warehousing, it can be used to
analyze and represent data. For Service Ori-
ented Architectures (SOA), it can be used
to execute complex computations. In doc-
ument management and software develop-
ment tools, it can be used to identify the
lifecycle of a document. As the nature of the
large range of applications differs, so does
their technique of managing the provenance
records.
Data provenance was classified in several
categories based on the techniques used to
trace the records and the way these are pre-
served. The techniques for data tracing are
classified under two approaches: “lazy” and
“eager” (W. C. Tan, 2004). In the “lazy”
approach, provenance records are computed
only when they are required, while prove-
nance records are carried with the data in
the “eager” approach. Sequence-of-Delta
and Timestamping are two alternative ap-
proaches of archiving provenance records
(W. C. Tan, 2004). The Sequence-of-Delta
approach stores the reference version and a
sequence of forward or backward deltas be-
tween versions. On the other hand, times-
tamping uses versions and times to identify
data at various steps of its lifetime.
Provenance can also be discussed from
the points of the affect of the source
data on the existence of data records, or
the locations from which those records are
fetched (Buneman, Khanna, & Wang-Chiew,
2001). These concepts are termed as why-
provenance and where-provenance, respec-
tively. From the aspect of data process-
ing architecture, another classification was
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proposed by (Simmhan, Plale, & Gannon,
2005). This approach was later adopted
by (Muniswamy-Reddy, Holland, Braun, &
Seltzer, 2006) and elaborated with more cat-
egories. They extend the database-oriented
approach of (Simmhan et al., 2005) to in-
clude a file and file-system oriented ap-
proach called Provenance Aware Storage
System (PASS). A grid-based solution com-
prises the service-oriented architecture in
which software-development tools are part of
a scripting-architecture. Environment archi-
tecture was the fourth category included by
(Muniswamy-Reddy et al., 2006).
In a domain-specific approach of storing
provenance, data and provenance are loosely
coupled, as data is managed by the file sys-
tem and provenance is stored in database
systems (Muniswamy-Reddy et al., 2006).
Lineage File System (LinFS) used a third
party database to store provenance records
while able to track it at file system level au-
tomatically (Sar & Cao, 2005). The obvi-
ous issue with file and provenance separa-
tion was addressed in Flexible Image Trans-
port System by (Wells, Greisen, & Harten,
1981) where the file header contains the ad-
ditional attributes as a provenance record.
Another approach for tight coupling be-
tween data and provenance was later in-
troduced in PASS. PASS tracks the prove-
nance automatically like LinFS and man-
ages its database directly into the kernel by
its file system PASTA (Muniswamy-Reddy
et al., 2006). PASS proved its superiority
by ensuring better synchronization between
data and provenance; it also provides se-
curity over the provenance and features to
query those records. File Provenance Sys-
tem (FiPS) is another provenance system
that collects provenance records automati-
cally operating at the system level and below
the Virtual File System (VFS) layer (Sultana
& Bertino, 2013).
2.3.1 Challenges
Like digital forensics, the dynamic nature
of cloud computing and its architecture
introduces several challenges to establish
a successful provenance technique. Re-
searchers have highlighted heterogeneous ar-
chitecture of cloud infrastructure, granular-
ity , virtualization, availability and data in-
tegrity as the prime challenges while iden-
tifying a better provenance approach in
the cloud (Muniswamy-Reddy, Macko, &
Seltzer, 2010; Sakka, Defude, & Tellez, 2010;
Zhang, Kirchberg, Ko, & Lee, 2011; Katilu,
Franqueira, & Angelopoulou, 2015; Abbadi,
Lyle, et al., 2011).
(Muniswamy-Reddy et al., 2010) discov-
ered the lack of extensibility of existing
provenance systems in the area of cloud com-
puting and also their inability to support
availability and scalability as some of the
critical areas. Incompatible availability fea-
tures between the provenance system and
the cloud architecture may affect the prin-
ciple goal of provenance architecture. In ad-
dition, lack of scalability becomes clearly vis-
ible when a database is used to store prove-
nance in the cloud architecture. This feature
makes provenance records query-able, but
in a distributed architecture, it introduces a
deadlock or scalability bottleneck. Introduc-
tion of a parallel distributed database, a pos-
sible solution to this problem, is often crit-
icized because of its lack of maintainability
and cost.
(Sakka et al., 2010) highlighted challeng-
ing areas arise due to the variety in cloud
architecture. Difference in policies applied
by these architectures to identify objects
weaken the ability to establish a unique ob-
ject identification technique in cloud. Also,
there is no efficient and unified architec-
ture for an inter-operable provenance system
which could manage the heterogeneous poli-
cies followed by different entity and multiple
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level of granularity.
The virtualization feature of cloud archi-
tecture and its nature of fault tolerance also
imposes some technical issues in provenance
collection. (Zhang et al., 2011) discussed the
necessity of maintaining a record of operat-
ing systems, server locations and memory
management of virtual and physical envi-
ronments to provide more accurate informa-
tion to the consumers. They also prioritized
the maintenance of provenance information
about data migration which takes place in
case of hardware failure.
(Abbadi et al., 2011) presented taxonomy
of cloud infrastructures with a description
of the dynamic nature of this structure and
identified the challenges in the area of log-
ging and auditing. It is imperative for a
system administrator to identify the loca-
tion and reason of an error through auditing
and logging. But cloud’s multilayer archi-
tecture makes it difficult to identify the ori-
gin of data from humongous resources col-
lected from a large number of diversified
sources. (Abbadi et al., 2011) defined the
role of the administrator in this scenario as
identifying the time intervals when physical
layers and virtual layers are used by the vir-
tual resources and applications respectively,
and combining these records with other rele-
vant log files. They also spotted some short-
comings like lack of protection in maintain-
ing logging and auditing records and lack of
trustworthiness of the provider maintaining
the cloud infrastructure.
2.3.2 Requirements
In this section, requirements of data prove-
nance will be discussed from two different as-
pects: the mandatory properties to fulfill the
general criteria of a provenance record and
the required features for a successful prove-
nance technique in the cloud.
(Zhao, Bizer, Gil, Missier, & Sahoo, 2010)
categorized the requirement of provenance
based on concerning areas such as content,
management and usage which are essential
for an effective resource description frame-
work (RDF) model. They presented an elab-
orated discussion over each criterion. These
information include identity of the content,
evaluation of the content over the time,
records of processes or entities contributed in
its evaluation including justification and de-
sign choices behind the evaluation process.
From the management perspective of the
provenance records, a well-formatted repre-
sentation language and the accessibility of
the provenance records are also considered
as important attributes.
(Moreau et al., 2011) also identified a sim-
ilar set of integral components in their Open
Provenance Model (OPM). Basic informa-
tion about an object, processes and agents
involved in its evaluation, interdependencies
between different entities, and actual role of
the agents are the most important tokens
of a provenance record. This information
later needs to be recorded in an easily rep-
resentable language supported by heteroge-
neous systems and should allow customiza-
tion to include additional information. Ad-
ditionally, the recorded information should
be easily accessible with a simple query.
With the necessary attributes mentioned
above, provenance system also needs to fol-
low some standards in terms of data mainte-
nance, dependency on the associated appli-
cation, level of granularity and data integrity
and presentation (Muniswamy-Reddy et al.,
2010; Katilu et al., 2015; Taha, Chaisiri, &
Ko, 2015; Y. S. Tan, Ko, & Holmes, 2013).
The data-coupling feature confirms the as-
sociation between the data and provenance
records. Appropriate data coupling cancels
the chances of misleading data that might
contain new provenance information for old
data or vice-versa. This coupling must also
include the causal ordering among different
entities while recording the provenance in-
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formation (Muniswamy-Reddy et al., 2010).
A provenance tracking system should en-
able tracking a particular object from every
host in a distributed environment, which is
an essential property to detect an incident
and ensure accountability across a system.
That way, if multiple host contribute in any
operation on an object, provenance records
should maintain record for each responsi-
ble hosts. A provenance system should also
be independent of the application and plat-
form so that no additional configuration is
required to track if a new application is in-
troduced in a system or if the kernel of a
system is modified (W. C. Tan, 2004).
Provenance system should strictly main-
tain the integrity of the records by mak-
ing them temper-evident and ensure persis-
tence of the record. Data integrity assure
the accuracy or correctness of the records
over time while temper-evidence confirms re-
liability, authenticity, admissibility, believe-
ability and completeness (Taha et al., 2015).
On the other hand, persistence confirms the
existence of provenance information even
when the actual object is erased from the
system as long as the object has a descen-
dant. The nature of provenance information
also demands confidentiality in every level
of data management e.g., data access, data
storage and data collection.
Capturing provenance records from multi-
ple levels is also considered to be an essen-
tial property of a provenance system. Multi-
layer granularity provides complete scenario
of any incident occurred with an object in
different level of a system (Katilu et al.,
2015). An advanced interface to represent
the provenance record along with an ef-
ficient data retrieval technique is another
measure that defines the success of a prove-
nance system. This sort of interface with
efficient query mechanism helps identify-
ing any occurrence quickly and understand
patterns and characteristics of provenance
record (Katilu et al., 2015).
3. RELATED WORKS
Digital provenance, in the cloud environ-
ment, has been studied for a long time in
order to meet the critical requirements im-
posed by the architecture and to mitigate the
challenges revolved around digital forensics.
Some researchers proposed different prove-
nance techniques, while others have identi-
fied efficient approaches for effective forensic
solutions (Muniswamy-Reddy et al., 2010;
Zhang et al., 2011). Several techniques were
also proposed where provenance architecture
is specially discussed considering the require-
ments of digital forensic (Li, Chen, Huang,
& Wong, 2014; P. M. Trenwith & Venter,
2014; Lu, Lin, Liang, & Shen, 2010).
(Muniswamy-Reddy et al., 2010) extended
PASS for cloud architecture which was ini-
tially used in local file systems and net-
work attached storage. They have im-
plemented three provenance recording pro-
tocols using Amazon Web Service (AWS)
- single cloud storage, cloud storage with
cloud database, and cloud storage with cloud
database and messaging service based on
PASS. Cloud messaging service in the third
architecture ensured its superiority over the
other two by confirming provenance data-
coupling through transaction and providing
the fastest service.
Cloud providers usually track every oper-
ation executed inside a cloud environment
to ensure immediate response to any inci-
dent. Flogger is such a logging mechanism
which can track file provenance both in vir-
tual and physical machines (Ko, Jagadpra-
mana, & Lee, 2011). DataPROVE, a data
provenance technique was proposed based
on records generated by Flogger in collab-
oration with other system monitoring tools
like User, Process, Event Tracker, Change
Tracker and Network Traffic Tracker (Zhang
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et al., 2011). It collects provenance infor-
mation in the application layer service like
PaaS, SaaS and IaaS, rather than just vir-
tual and physical machine information. It
also captures other cloud related essential
provenance information like client identifi-
cation record and transfer of information
between different virtual and physical ma-
chines placed in different locations. Addi-
tionally, DataPROVE also provides efficient
data API for indexing and query operations.
S2Logger is another approach of maintain-
ing secured data provenance through logging
at the block-level and file-level. It is imple-
mented based on Flogger (Suen, Ko, Tan,
Jagadpramana, & Lee, 2013). In this mech-
anism, (Suen et al., 2013) addressed features
like capture mapping between virtual and
physical resources, proper maintenance of
the provenance chain and data integrity and
confidentiality. S2Logger also introduced an
end-to-end data tracing mechanism that is
capable of capturing detail provenance infor-
mation from all nodes connected in the cloud
environment.
(Lu et al., 2010) have designed a prove-
nance mechanism enabling the forensic fea-
tures in the cloud environment. Provenance
was designed based on a bilinear pairing
technique considering some critical aspects
of cloud like data confidentiality, anony-
mous access of the user, and dispute reso-
lution. This mechanism introduced compu-
tation and communication overhead at the
data owner’s end. This issue was later iden-
tified by (Li et al., 2014), and they have
introduced a broadcast encryption method
to overcome this. They have also ensured
anonymity of the user by implementing an
attribute-based signature (ABS) scheme for
access control and privacy by designing an
anonymous key-issuing protocol.
(P. M. Trenwith & Venter, 2014) discussed
another source of log information which may
allow the investigator to answer to the phys-
ical location of the data. They adopted a
provenance technique in their proposed sys-
tem where transport layer protocol informa-
tion was recorded to identify the location
of data. They also considered the appli-
cation layer data to answer the additional
queries like who, when, what and how infor-
mation which are required for a successful
forensic investigation. Provenance record is
proposed to be stored in a centralized log-
ging server which eventually can overcome
the problem of strong coupling between data
and its meta data and can also ensure data
integrity. They proposed another model for
provenance with features like digital object
tracking and location identification at any
point of the lifetime of that particular digi-
tal object (P. Trenwith & Venter, 2015). In
this model, they introduced the concept of a
wrapper object which wrapped a file along
with its provenance records embedded to-
gether and the location of the wrapper ob-
ject would be maintained in a separate cen-
tralized server.
4. FORENSIC
ENABLED
PROVENANCE MODEL
4.1 Additional Design
Consideration
Designing an efficient and forensic enabled
provenance mechanism in a cloud environ-
ment requires that some other areas be con-
sidered which vastly contribute to the suc-
cess of the process. Identifying the possi-
ble sources of provenance records, deciding
on a unified model to store those records,
data storage with required features for ef-
ficient data management, and ensuring se-
curity and integrity of the data for forensic
operations are important factors that must
be considered for a provenance mechanism.
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General cloud architecture can be divided
into several layers – physical resource layer,
resource abstraction layer and service layer
as shown in Figure 4. (Ruan & Carthy,
2012) identified the sources of forensic ar-
tifacts from each of the layers. Among
these, it is necessary to identify the actual
sources which provide necessary provenance
related information and help in forensic anal-
ysis. Hard disks, network logs and access
records are important sources from the phys-
ical layer. Event logs and virtual resources
are necessary from the abstraction layer, and
access logs, events logs, rigid information
about the virtual operating system, and ap-
plication logs are vital sources from the ser-
vice layer. (Imran & Hlavacs, 2013) identi-
fied provenance information in different sub-
layers of the service layer and developed an
integrated provenance data collection pro-
cess. In our conceptual model approach of
collecting provenance data, we will also con-
sider the featured criteria used in these pro-
posed systems which can be helpful for the
forensic process.
Figure 4. Cloud System Architecture
([(Bohn et al., 2011)])
The format and properties for logging
provenance data collected from different
sources is important in a provenance collec-
tion system. (Marty, 2011) has identified
some important properties of provenance
data like timestamps, application, user, ses-
sion id, category, and reason and severity
of the event. Applications running in the
service layer mostly contribute to this type
of information which can be collected from
different application and event logs. A dis-
tributed file system, like Google File System
(GFS), maintains a separate set of informa-
tion vital for provenance and forensics. The
GFS master usually keeps information file
and chunk (part of a file) namespace, map-
ping from file to chunks, and location of the
replica of the chunks (Ghemawat, Gobioff, &
Leung, 2003). The Hadoop Distributed File
System (HDFS) also maintains a transaction
log, called EditLog, in its NameNode which
contains every modification recorded in file
system metadata (Borthakur et al., 2008).
Google cloud maintains region and zone re-
lated information while creating a virtual
machine instance recording which has prove-
nance data along with other information
that may guide an investigator in forensic
analysis. The heterogeneous characteristics
of these records make the process of choos-
ing a particular format very hard. Marty has
suggested a syntax of logging the informa-
tion as “key-value” pair, which is considered
as an ideal syntax of logging information in
our design approach. We also include a uni-
fied naming approach of the “key” to ensure
synchronicity of the same properties coming
from different from sources.
Provenance data records must be eas-
ily searchable; therefore, a data repository
that can provide the best performance and
an efficient query interface must be chosen.
(Muniswamy-Reddy, 2006) explored differ-
ent database architectures to choose the best
data repository. They considered aspects
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like the format of maintaining dependency
of the files and different approaches of stor-
ing the annotation metadata. They com-
pared Berkley DB as a schemaless database,
MySQL as a RDBMS database, XMLDB as
XML database and OpenLDAP as a rep-
resentative of an LDAP architecture and
found that Berkley DB outperformed other
database architectures in terms of stan-
dard database related operations in this sce-
nario. While implementing PASS in cloud,
(Muniswamy-Reddy et al., 2010) also used
SimpleDB and Amazon S3 to store prove-
nance objects.
Provenance records logged in different lay-
ers are basically maintained by different ac-
tors of the cloud. Cloud consumers are usu-
ally responsible for the records maintenance
service layer while providers manage the log-
ging activities of the abstraction and physi-
cal layers. Provenance records in these lay-
ers may often be affected by the collusion
between the consumer and provider which
eventually can mislead the forensic investi-
gator. The investigator can also play the role
of an accomplice with either of these parties,
which ultimately diminishes the whole ap-
proach of data provenance and forensic anal-
ysis. To ensure integrity of the provenance
data and trustworthiness of the collection
system, it is necessary to include a verifica-
tion process which can be used to validate
the provenance information. (Zawoad et al.,
2015) proposed a Proof Publisher Method
(PPM) in their Open Cloud Forensic (OCF)
which can be used by the court authority to
verify the forensic reports provided by the
investigators. They also proposed a reliable
way of collecting the evidence through se-
cured read-only APIs accessible only by the
investigator and court authority.
4.2 Proposed Model
Figure 5 shows the proposed Forensic En-
abled Cloud Provenance Model. This sec-
tion will provide a description of the pro-
posed model and surveys its requirements
of provenance, forensic analysis, and neces-
sary design considerations. The concept of
the general actors of cloud operations and
forensic analysis have been utilized in this
model; however, the contribution of each of
the cloud actors and access mechanisms to
the provenance records for the investigator
and court authority have been redefined. It
is also necessary to introduce a unified log-
ging mechanism in different layers of a cloud
environment to leverage data manipulation
while recording provenance information in a
persistent database.
Figure 5. Forensic Enabled Cloud Prove-
nance Model
In a cloud model, consumers and providers
are the two main contributors to the cloud
operation, while a cloud auditor basically
performs analysis on the cloud services and
provides feedback. In the proposed model,
an additional responsibility for the cloud au-
ditors is included. Usually cloud services like
SaaS and PaaS are designed to provide the
consumer with less control over the system
while IaaS allows configuring the necessary
applications. In these scenarios, a cloud au-
ditor’s additional responsibility will be moni-
toring whether the services used by the con-
sumers are capable of logging every opera-
tion or whether a provider enables the log-
ging features for each application where the
consumer has limited access. The providers
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additional responsibility will be introducing
policies in SLA which will clearly instruct
the clients about installing necessary audit-
ing features. The provider should also re-
design the access policies so that the client
can have enough options for customization.
The provider should also be capable of mon-
itoring every operation performed by the
client. In an ideal scenario, the provider
should install firewalls and other applica-
tions to detect intrusions or any form of ma-
licious activity.
Database architecture is an important as-
pect of designing an ideal provenance model.
It is required not only to accommodate a
variety of information or manage large vol-
umes of data, but also to ensure availabil-
ity and scalability. Considering these facts,
the proposed system is a schema-less dis-
tributed database system to store the prove-
nance record coming in heterogeneous for-
mat from different sources. The distributed
nature of the database architecture will en-
sure the availability and scalability features.
Data will be stored in a key-value format
where the key name will maintain a con-
sistent naming convention to facilitate the
query operation maintained through a uni-
fied data modeling policy. Each transaction
will be logged separately with the reference
to the dependent object. Keeping a single
instance of the provenance record requires
updating the instance very frequently and
hence reduces the expected performance of
the system. In the case of recording prove-
nance for a file, it is recommended that a
copy of the content that will be logged in
the repository be maintained. Provenance
record of a data should also maintain rela-
tionship information with the process or en-
vironment variables that effected it at any
point of its lifetime.
A timestamp with every transaction is a
vital field. Loggers in different layers will re-
quire maintaining strict synchronization of
time to capture the sequence of events prop-
erly. To maintain proper chronology of the
data from different systems, each transaction
will be saved with timestamp information for
both the source and data storage system.
This will eventually help in identifying the
unsynchronized nodes or sources.
Trustworthy data storage policy is another
important concern. It is necessary to en-
sure integrity of the data and employ tech-
niques to easily identify any forged data and
possible miscreants. To ensure this, the
database should be designed for capturing
necessary audit information. Audit informa-
tion will include the application or user iden-
tity which eventually stores or update any
information. For all of the data that will be
saved an additional attribute will be added
as provenance. This attribute will contain
the hash value of the data item. This hashed
data will be used later for verification of the
information.
If any issue is reported by any of the other
three actors of cloud services, the process of
forensic analysis starts. In this case, an in-
vestigator will conduct the preliminary in-
vestigation by collecting provenance records
from the provenance storage and finally pre-
pare a report eligible for submission to the
court authority. The court authority will
verify the report and provide the verdict. To
facilitate this process, query and verification
interfaces for the investigator and court au-
thority have been introduced in the proposed
system. These services will be provided by
the service providers.
4.3 Discussion
This section briefly demonstrates how the
proposed model of provenance collection
overcomes the challenges already discussed
in Section 2 and how efficiently this model
can facilitate the process of forensic analy-
sis. In table-1, we also present a compara-
tive analysis with the existing approaches in
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terms of the challenges of provenance man-
agement for forensic analysis in public cloud
addressed by those models.
One of the primary concerns about cloud
computing is the shift of control of data or
files to a different authority. Data might be
affected by malicious attacks, software bugs
or system failure. The distributed nature of
cloud architecture can ensure availability of
data in these scenarios. Any unlawful access
from a provider’s end can be easily identified
through the provenance information, as ev-
ery access to any file or data is recorded by
the provenance system.
Allowing multi-tenant facility through vir-
tualization and identifying the location is the
most notable challenge in a public cloud en-
vironment. Collecting snapshots of virtual
machine logs with additional information to
identify the virtual machine instance can
solve this problem. File system metadata
contains details about the file status and lo-
cation. Integrating necessary measures al-
ready discussed in 4.1 can lead to an efficient
solution to these issues. Maintaining prove-
nance records with location information will
eventually help investigators identifying the
location of an object and collect necessary
artifacts accordingly.
Forensic investigation is often hampered
because of the lack of synchronization be-
tween stored records and variations of
records coming from different sources. In the
proposed model, a unified model to identify
attributes of the entity and relevant oper-
ations is introduced. This will facilitate the
process of analysis as investigators can easily
identify and differentiate between entities of
a particular piece of information and their
effect on the provenance record or forensic
analysis.
Managing the large collection of prove-
nance data is a difficult job. The large
volume of information, variety in data for-
mats and increase in volume in high veloc-
ity make the provenance collection process
a highly challenging task. To ensure effi-
cient forensic analysis, a provenance collec-
tion technique can compromise none of these
concerns. Hence, it is recommended to en-
sure a better data management policy. The
proposed model suggests a unified naming
convention for “keys” coming from different
sources. A well-chosen naming conversion
helps to identify the exact information in
search and can also identify relations in log
information coming from different sources.
Regeneration of data or an incident from
the lineage information is another focus
of a data provenance system. Provenance
records maintained with the actual content
can ease this process as an investigator can
easily extract any verified content from the
provenance storage and apply the opera-
tions which occur in the other version of the
data to check if these operations generate
the same result. This forensic enabled data
provenance model also considers the storing
of the data along with its metadata in the
provenance log.
This proposed provenance model collects
information from different layers of a cloud
architecture. It also considers necessary
measures to include location information
and other attributes required to identify the
related entities or actions of data. This large
volume of information opens enough oppor-
tunity for proper analysis.
A loose coupling between data and prove-
nance records is maintained as prove-
nance information is stored separately in
a database. Separation between these two
records ensure the existence of provenance
information even if the actual data is miss-
ing. By nature, provenance information is
immutable and persistent. If any provenance
is deleted from the database intentionally, a
database audit can provide necessary hints
to identify the miscreants.
The proposed model also prioritizes the
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Proposed Approaches
(Muniswamy-
Reddy et al.,
2010)
(Zhang
et al.,
2011)
(Li et
al.,
2014)
(P. M. Tren-
with &
Venter,
2014)
(Lu
et al.,
2010)
Our
Ap-
proach
Public
Cloud
Virtualization 3 3
Security &
Privacy
3 3 3 3 3
Data Loca-
tion
3 3
Digital
Forensic
Data Preser-
vation
3 3 3 3
Identification 3 3 3 3 3
Collection 3 3 3 3
Scenario Re-
construction
3 3 3 3 3
Presentation 3
Provenance
Data Cou-
pling
3 3 3
Cross-Host
Tracking
3
Application
Independence
3 3
Multilayer
Granularity
3 3 3
Data In-
tegrity
3 3 3 3 3
Confidentiality 3 3 3 3
Query-able 3 3 3
Persistence 3 3
Causal Or-
dering
3 3 3
Table 1. Comparative analysis of the proposed approaches
necessity of a query and verification inter-
face for the investigator and court author-
ity. A well-designed interface with features
of executing customize requests to extract
required information from the provenance
database can prove the efficiency of a prove-
nance model. Effective data visualization
is another important aspect of these inter-
faces. A detailed overview of an event in
chronological order, providing information
about a file with location and list of pro-
cesses that contributed in evolution of the
file can help an investigator define the le-
gal boundary while requesting for actual ar-
tifacts from the providers without interven-
ing other users’ information and identifying
the actual lineage of the file. A step by step
verification can also help a jury or court au-
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thority to detect the possible symptoms of
collusion between the consumer and cloud
service provider, consumer and investigator,
or provider and investigator.
5. CONCLUSION
Maintaining the provenance information of
data is as important as the data itself. In
modern day computing technology, it is an
integral part of data to ensure its authen-
ticity and integrity. In this paper, we have
identified the challenges of cloud architec-
ture, discussed how this affects the existing
forensic analysis and provenance techniques,
and discussed a model for efficient prove-
nance collection and forensic analysis. We
have also briefly highlighted the necessity of
provenance data visualization and explained
why or how it can be helpful for modern day
forensic analysis.
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